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I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental policy of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association1 (NCAA) is "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an inte-
gral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports."2 A
student athlete is defined by the NCAA as "one who engages in a
particular sport for the educational, physical, mental and social
benefits derived therefrom and to whom participation in that sport
is an avocation." a In an attempt to carry out this policy, the NCAA
developed a multitude of rules regulating recruiting, playing and
practicing, financial aid, eligibility, and numerous administrative
areas. One of these areas that has received recent notoriety is the
academic eligibility of college athletes.
1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a private non-profit association. The
NCAA consists of approximately 900 members. Membership is open to four-year institu-
tions which meet certain academic standards. Allied and Associate membership is open to
athletic conferences, associations and other groups interested in intercollegiate athletics The
NCAA operates pursuant to a Constitution and Bylaws adopted by the membership and
subject to amendment by the members. The general policies of the NCAA are established
by the membership at annual conventions. When the annual convention is not in session,
policy is established and directed by the NCAA Council of 22 members elected by the entire
membership at the annual convention. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 1982), afl'd in part,
rev'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), afl'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
2. NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2, reprinted in 1985-86 Manual of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association [hereinafter NCAA Manual] at 7.
3. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 1, reprinted in NCAA Manual at 9.
1
Dinardo: The New NCAA Academic Standards: Are They Constitutional? Are The
Published by Institutional Repository, 1987
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
Some schools have been forced into new courses of action by
publicly embarrassing events. Following the death of basketball
player Len Bias, the Chancellor of the University of Maryland,
who is also the chairman of the NCAA's presidents' commission,
made several changes in an effort to address the academic
problems of student-athletes at the University of Maryland." He
shifted academic counseling of athletes to an academic department
in hopes that the removal of counseling from the athletic depart-
ment will lead to advice aimed at meeting the academic standards
and requirements of the University and not advice designed merely
to retain eligibility.5 Additionally, the Chancellor attempted to
have the NCAA bar the participation of freshman in athletic com-
petition and limit freshman practice time to fifteen hours per
week.
Jan Kemp, an assistant professor of English at the University
of Georgia, was fired for protesting preferential academic treat-
ment for athletes.7 Kemp won a $2.57 million settlement and rein-
statement in a highly publicized lawsuit which brought academic
abuses by student-athletes and athletic departments to the atten-
tion of the public and the administrations of colleges and universi-
ties.' Academic institutions should not wait for a tragedy to occur
or a whistleblower to step forward before steps are taken to correct
the problems existing in college athletics.
Since the initial adoption of the current academic standards in
January 1983, there has been a great deal of criticism concerning
the effect, fairness, and likelihood of the rule attaining its goal.
The new academic standard for students participating in Division I
athletics went into effect in August, 1986. This rule is an attempt
by the NCAA to restore academic integrity to collegiate athletics.
This paper will examine the rule, its underlying policy, and the
legal challenges which have been advanced against it.
II. CURRENT ELIGIBILITY RULES
To be eligible to practice and play in Division I sports, an en-
4. Farrell & Monaghan, U. of Maryland Athletic Director Quits; Task Force Faults
Sports Department for Players' Academic Ills, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Oct. 15, 1986, at
45, col. 2.
5. Id. at 48, col. 3.
6. Id. at 48, col 5.
7. Lederman, Many Faculty Members Seek Greater Rule in Athletic Decision-Mak-








have graduated high school with a 2.0 grade point average, on a
scale of 4.0, in a core curriculum of at least 11 academic courses
including at least three years of English, two years of mathemat-
ics, two years of social science and two years of natural or physi-
cal science, including at least one laboratory class, if it is offered
by the high school. Additionally, the student must have a com-
bined SAT score of 700 or a 15 composite score on the ACT.'
If a student fails to meet these requirements, he or she is ineligible
to participate during the first year of college and loses one year of
eligibility.'0
In the years after the athlete's first year in residence or after
the athlete has used one year of eligibility, he or she must, prior to
each term in which a season of competition begins, satisfactorily
complete an average of twelve semester or quarter hours during
each of the preceding semesters or quarters in which the athlete
has been enrolled." The satisfactory completion requirement will
be met if the athlete maintains a grade point average that places
him or her in good academic standing as established by the institu-
tion for all students. 2
Several rationales for the rule have been offered by the NCAA
Ad Hoc Committee on Problems of Major Intercollegiate Athletics
Programs,3 the committee which proposed the new rules. Derek C.
Bok, chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and President of
Harvard University, and J. W. Peltason, President of the American
Council on Education"' (ACE) stated that the purpose of the corn-
9. Bylaw 5-1-(j), reprinted in NCAA Manual at 92.
10. Id.
11. Bylaw 5-1-(j)-(6), reprinted in NCAA Manual at 94.
12. Bylaw 5-1-(j)-(6)-(ii), reprinted in NCAA Manual at 95.
13. The Ad Hoc Committee on Problems of Major Intercollegiate Athletic Programs
[hereinafter the Ad Hoc Committee] is comprised of forty college presidents, the American
Council on Education's president and executive vice-president and a representative from
the Association of American Universities. The Committee was formed to provide a new fo-
rum through which campus executives could deal with recruitment violations, illegal pay-
ments to student-athletes and other problems which have recently tainted college athletics.
See Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism? 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 101, 106 (1984).
14. The American Council on Education is the principal coordinating body for post-
secondary education and consists of 1600 colleges and universities. The ACE operates
through a 37-member Board of Directors, its chair, a president and various committees and
task forces. "Through voluntary and cooperative action, the council provides comprehensive
leadership for improving education standards, policies, procedures, and services," Greene,
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mittee was to bring about changes that are needed to reassert the
view that student-athletes are students first and athletes second."5
The letter expressed a concern that "in the zeal to produce win-
ning teams, athletic eligibility has often been placed ahead of aca-
demic qualifications." '16 It was also felt that the previous rule re-
quiring a 2.0 high school grade point average extended eligibility to
"a large number of athletes who have little or no chance or success-
fully completing a course of study in [college] institutions.'",
One member of the committee was concerned that universities
were losing sight of their purpose of providing higher education,
not remediation. 18 Another member suggested that higher stan-
dards would result if high schools improved the courses offered
and established and enforced responsible graduation criteria.1 9 Mo-
tivation for change may also have come from the need to re-estab-
lish the credibility of colleges whose reputations have been dam-
aged due to recruiting violations, alteration of academic records
and other NCAA rule violations.2
The NCAA used other schemes in the past to determine aca-
demic eligibility for athletes. To be eligible between 1966 to i973, a
freshman had to "predict" an ability to maintain a 1.6 grade point
average (GPA) in college.2 This "prediction" was based on two
factors: high school grades or class rank and a score on a scholastic
aptitude test.22 The purposes of the rule were to prevent the ex-
ploitation of athletes who would probably be unable to complete
the academic requirements necessary to earn a degree, to further
the image that college athletes were primarily students, and to en-
courage those who could not meet the requirements to devote their
freshman year to study."
The 1.6 rule was challenged in Associated Students, Inc. v.
NCAA.24 The court held that the rule was reasonably related to its
.15. Greene, supra note 8, at 108.





21. Waicukauski, The Regulation of Academic Standards in Intercollegiate Athletics,
1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 79, 91 (1982).
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 1974)).
24. 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974) Associated Students, Inc., and eleven individual stu-
dents brought an action against the NCAA alleging that the 1.6 rule resulted in an unrea-
sonable classification in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The students were admitted
to the California State University at Sacramento (CSUS) under the "Four Percent Rule."
The Four Percent rule was a statutory provision under which a student could qualify for
[Vol. 4:411
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purposes, even with regard to those who failed to predict a 1.6
GPA but earned a 1.6 GPA after the first year.2" In 1973, the mem-
bership of the NCAA, in an effort to simplify administration of
eligibility requirements and in response to concern for special ad-
missions and institutional autonomy, voted to relax the academic
eligibility requirements and replace the 1.6 rule with the 2.0 rule."
From 1973 to 1986, the 2.0 rule provided that a freshman was ineli-
gible to practice to play if he or she did not graduate from high
school with at least a 2.0 grade point average on a scale of 4.0.21
The grade point average was required to be calculated in the same
manner as it would be calculated for any other student at the high
school. 8
In Jones v. Wichita State University,9 a basketball player
challenged the 2.0 rule on equal protection grounds. Jones alleged
that allowing each individual high school to determine the classes
that were to be included in the computation of the GPA resulted
in the creation of disparate classes.30 Some high schools included
physical education grades in the computation while others did
not." This resulted in some students being ineligible even though
"they had the same academic achievement . . . as their counter-
parts who are eligible under the standard." 32 Because Jones was
not a member of a suspect class, however, the 2.0 rule was evalu-
ated under the rationality test and only needed to bear some rea-
sonable relationship to a legitimate interest to pass constitutional
muster." An NCAA official testified that the purposes of the rule
admission based on factors such as economic need, motivation and maturity without satisfy-
ing the usual requirements which include taking a standard achievement test. Without a
test grade, a student could not satisfy the 1.6 rule regardless of his or her high school grade
point average or class rank. Although the students did not predict a 1.6 grade point average,
they participated in athletics during their freshman year and earned at least a 1.6 grade
point average at CSUS. When the NCAA learned of the violation, it required CSUS to de-
clare the students ineligible for one year or pay stiff fines. The students argued that the rule
violated the Equal Protection clause as it applied to them because it sought to declare ineli-
gible students who earned at least a 1.6 grade point average during their freshman year.
25. Id. at 1256. See also 2 R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BusiNEss OF THE SPORTS
INDUSTRIES 101-109 (1986).
26. Cross, The College Athlete and the Institution, 38 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROSS. 151,
158-59 (1973).
27. Waicukauski, supra note 16, at 89.
28. R. BERRY & G. WONG, supra note 20, at 108.
29. 698 F.2d 1082 (10th Cir. 1983).
30. Id. at 1086.
31. Id. at 1084.
32. Id. at 1086.
33. Id. The equal protection doctrine ensures that those similarly situated will be
treated similarly. Two levels of review have developed under the doctrine. The "mere ra-
19871
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were the same as those of the 1.6 rule: to prevent the exploitation
of young athletes by prohibiting the recruitment of athletes who
will probably be unable to complete the academic requirements for
a degree, to further the policy of the Association that participants
are students first and athletes second, and to encourage those who
cannot meet the requirements to devote their time to study rather
than athletics during their freshman year. 4 The court upheld the
rule and its objectives as reasonable.3 5 Despite its lofty goals, the
lack of uniformity in computation of high school GPAs, the possi-
bility of inaccurate transcripts, and doubt as to the academic
achievement necessary to obtain a 2.0 in some schools made the 2.0
rule relatively meaningless.3 6
III. GROUNDS FOR POTENTIAL CHALLENGES
Opponents of the new rule raise two primary concerns. The
first is the lack of representation of historically black institutions
and other affected groups on the Ad Hoc Committee that formu-
lated the rule. The other concern is the appropriateness of using
standardized test scores as an element of freshman eligibility."7
Groups excluded from the promulgation which will be affected by
the new process include blacks, historically black colleges, and high
schools.38 J. W. Peltason, President of the ACE, stated that he ini-
tially sought to include the presidents of the Division I-A schools
in forming the Ad Hoc Committee. 9 There are no black institu-
tions or presidents in Division I-A.' ° Peltason said that when the
focus of the committee changed to academic standards he invited
some of the presidents of historically black colleges to join the
committee but his invitations were declined because they were not
tionality" standard asks only whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational
relationship to an end of government which is permissible. A classification will be upheld
under "strict scrutiny" only if it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Strict
scrutiny is applied to suspect classifications and those classifications impairing fundamental
rights. A third, middle standard of review has arguably developed. It has been applied to
classifications based on gender and legitimacy and asks if the means chosen by the govern-
ment bear a fair and substantial relationship to an important government objective. See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-94 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521-43 (3d ed. 1986).
34. Jones, 698 F.2d at 1087.
35. Id.
36. Waicukauski, supra note 16, at 90.
37. Greene, supra note 8, at 111-12.
38. Id. at 112.
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included in the process from the beginning.41 Several weeks before
the NCAA convention, but after the proposals were finalized, an
invitation was extended to the president of Delaware State Univer-
sity, a predominantly black school. The invitation was accepted.42
There has also been a suggestion that the racial controversy was a
surprise and the presence of a black representative was an
afterthought."
Also excluded from the process were representatives from sec-
ondary educational institutions." None of the governing bodies
within the NCAA include representatives from such institutions. 5
In a 1974 ACE Report on Intercollegiate Athletics, the ACE recog-
nized that secondary educational institutions, their students,
teachers, counselors, administrators, and athletic department per-
sonnel were directly affected by intercollegiate athletics. 8 In spite
of the ACE report, it appears that the impact of the new standards
on such institutions may not have been been considered.
Opponents of the new rule object primarily to the use of stan-
dardized test scores in determining eligibility, citing a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on black students.48 Statistical data
emerging after the adoption of the rule seems to support the alle-
gation of disproportionate impact. Gregory R. Anrig, President of
Educational Testing Service, cautioned that the use of a fixed cut-
off score on standardized tests will have effects that may not have
been fully realized before the decision was reached.4 9 Anrig stated
that based on 1981 figures for college-bound high school seniors,
almost 51 percent of black males and 60 percent of black females
would be ineligible their freshman year under the NCAA rule."
The percentage of white students affected would be smaller.5 1 A
study of the athletes attending schools in the Big Eight Conference
in 1982-1983 concluded that more than 60 percent of the black
athletes would have been barred in their freshman year had such a
rule been in effect, as compared to between 10 and 27 percent of
41. Id.
42. Id. at 114-15.
43. Id. at 114.
44. Id. at 115.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 115 n.71.
47. Id. at 115.
48. Yasser, The Black Athletes' Equal Protection Case Against the NCAA's New Ac-
ademic Standards, 19 GONz. L. REv. 83, 84 (1983/1984).
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the white athletes at the same institutions.52
There are two potential avenues for judicial review of the new
eligibility rule: equal protection and private association law. In or-
der to reach an equal protection analysis, it must first be estab-
lished that the NCAA action amounts to state action. The consti-
tutional restraints of due process and equal protection do not
apply to private action unless a sufficiently close nexus exists be-
tween the state and the challenged action of the private entity so
that the action of the private entity can be fairly treated as that of
the State."
A. State Action Doctrine
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have narrowed
the state action doctrine. 54 In Blum v. Yaretsky5 5 and Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn," the Court held that the mere fact that an entity
was regulated by the state and received much of its funding from
state or federal sources did not make the acts of the entity state
action. In so ruling, the Court held that a "state normally can be
held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, ei-
ther overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the state." 57 The mere participation of state sponsored in-
stitutions in the NCAA and its rule-making processes may not be a
significant enough exercise of power to treat the actions of the
NCAA as those of the state.
The state action doctrine has not been applied consistently to
collegiate sports. Several courts have found that the NCAA does
52. Id. at 86.
53. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
54. Greene, supra note 8, at 124. See also Martin, The NCAA and Its Student Ath-
letes: Is There Still State Action?, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 49 (1985/1986).
55. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). In Blum, Medicaid patients in private nursing homes in New
York challenged transfer decisions made by personnel as lacking due process. Although pri-
vate facilities, the homes were heavily regulated by the state and received substantial state
funding. Id. at 1004. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact of state regulation and
funding does not make the transfers "state action," noting that the regulations do not re-
quire the facility to rely on government standards in making transfer decisions. Id. "[The]
decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to profes-
sional standards which are not set by the State." Id. at 1008.
56. 457 U.S. 530 (1982). In Rendell-Baker, the Court found no "state action" in the
speech-related dismissal of a teacher by a heavily state regulated and substantially state
funded private school. Neither the state regulations imposed on the school nor the provi-
sions of the contract under which the school provided an education to problem children for
the state imposed specific personnel requirements. Id. at 841.
57. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
[Vol. 4:411
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not act with state authority. Others have come to the opposite con-
clusion. In Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 58 the plaintiff athlete challenged an
NCAA eligibility rule. Under the then-existing rule, any participa-
tion in organized competition during each twelve month period af-
ter the student's twentieth birthday and before matriculation at a
member institution counts as one year of varsity competition.59
Arlosoroff challenged the rule on equal protection grounds, claim-
ing that the rule was designed to exclude aliens from participation
in NCAA affiliated programs.60 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit noted that although the NCAA may be said to per-
form a public function as the "overseer of the nation's intercollegi-
ate athletics," the regulation of collegiate athletics was not a func-
tion "traditionally exclusively reserved to the states."6 The fact
that over half of the NCAA's revenues are provided by public in-
stitutions was also not sufficient to find state action." Citing
Rendell-Baker and Blum, the court found that if the state in its
regulation and subsidizing of these institutions does not order or
cause the action complained of, and if the action is not one tradi-
tionally reserved to the state, there is no state action."
In McHale v. Cornell University," the court denied a request
for an injunction which would have allowed the plaintiff to partici-
pate in the 1985 football season pending an appeal. The plaintiff
brought equal protection and due process actions against Cornell
and the NCAA challenging the NCAA's transfer rule. The rule re-
quired that a student transferring to a Division I school complete
one year at the new institution before becoming eligible to compete
in intercollegiate athletics.6 5 The court failed to find a likelihood of
success on the merits s due to the Supreme Court's rulings in
Rendell-Baker and Blum.
7
A similar finding was reached in Barbay v. NCAA." The
58. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 1020.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1021.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1022.
64. 620 F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
65. Id. at 68.
66. A preliminary injunction will be issued upon a showing that irreparable injury is
likely to occur without the injunction, and a demonstration of either a likelihood of success
on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them fair grounds
for litigation. The moving party must also show that the balance of hardships in the case
tips in his favor. Id. at 68.
67. Id. at 70.
68. No. 86-5697, (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
1987]
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plaintiff filed a petition for an injunction which would prevent the
NCAA and Louisiana State University from declaring him ineligi-
ble to practice for and participate in the 1987 Sugar Bowl pending
the resolution of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.69 The court denied the
request for an injunction because the plaintiff failed to show a sub-
stantial likelihood of success on the merits.7" To succeed under sec-
tion 1983, the plaintiff must establish that the conduct complained
of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and
the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." In
order to find that the actions of the NCAA were state action, it
must be established either that the NCAA performed a function
traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state or that the state
or its agencies caused, controlled or directed the NCAA's action."2
The court held that the Supreme Court's rulings in Rendell-Baker
and Blum precluded a finding that the NCAA's conduct was state
action. 3
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's state ac-
tion jurisprudence and the precedent of Arlosoroff, McHale, and
Barbay, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the regulatory ac-
tions of the NCAA were state action. In Tarkanian v. NCAA, 4 the
NCAA challenged an injunction issued by the lower court which
prohibited the NCAA-ordered suspension of Tarkanian as the Uni-
versity of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), basketball coach. The
NCAA argued that Rendell-Baker and Blum prohibited a finding
of state action.7 5 The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed."' Citing
the recent United States Supreme Court decisions, the Nevada
Court found that state action could be present if the private entity
had exercised powers traditionally reserved to the state.77 Because
UNLV was a state institution, Tarkanian was a state employee. 8
In the Nevada Supreme Court's view, the right to discipline state






74. 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1011 (1988).
75. Id. at 1347 the NCAA also relied on Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982). The Nevada Supreme Court referred to all three cases as the Blum trilogy.
76. Id.
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tion of authority to the NCAA over athletic personnel decisions
and implementation of the NCAA's directive to suspend
Tarkanian amounted to state action by the NCAA. 8°
The Tarkanian court is not the first to come to this conclu-
sion. In Parish v. NCAA, 81 the court noted "that were the NCAA
to disappear tomorrow, government would soon step in to fill the
void." It then went on to note that "it would be strange doctrine
indeed to hold that the states could avoid the restrictions placed
upon them by the Constitution by bonding together to form a 'pri-
vate' organization to which they have relinquished some portion of
their governmental power.82 In Howard University v. NCAA, 85 the
court found that state institutions were the dominant force in de-
termining NCAA policies and actions by virtue of their size and
numbers. Although the NCAA might not perform a traditional
state function or control the details of the NCAA's operation,8 the
public institutions have delegated substantial power to a private
organization."' If the state retained these powers, then there would
be no question that state action existed and constitutional scrutiny
would apply.8e Does delegation of a state power to a private organi-
zation sufficiently remove its actions from the purview of the Con-
stitution? The NCAA is not providing a service to the state as were
the private nursing homes in Blum or the private school in
Rendell-Baker.8s Instead, the NCAA is exercising powers delegated
to it by the state."8
The NCAA has been called "the only game in town." 9 In light
80. Id. at 1349.
81. 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975) Parish and four other Centenary College bas-
ketball players sought a permanent injunction forbidding the NCAA's enforcement of sanc-
tions in response to violations of the 1.600 rule.
82. Id.
83. 510 F.2d 213, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Howard University and one of its students
sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the NCAA alleging violations of the Equal
Protection clause and the Due Process clause. Applying the NCAA's "Five-Year Rule," "1.6
Rule," and "Foreign-Student Rule," the NCAA found that certain members of Howard's
intercollegiate soccer competition completed in two NCAA championships while ineligible.
The court found that there was "state action" present and that the five-year and 1.6 rules,
but not the foreign-student rule, passed constitutional scrutiny. The court did not find a
violation of due process.
84. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022. The court noted that there was no indication that the
representatives of the state institutions joined together to approve the rule over the objec-
tions of the private institutions.
85. Martin, supra note 49, at 73.
86. Id. at 73.
87. Id. at 74.
88. Id.
89. Greene, supra note 8, at 138.
19871
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of the involuntary situation facing colleges and the fact that the
initial eligibility rule may involve a suspect classification, then the
issue of state action should be reviewed more closely while analyz-
ing a challenge of the rule.
B. Equal Protection Issues
If the state action question is overcome, two approaches may
be taken in arguing the equal protection issue. Disproportionate
impact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the new rule. 0 An in-
tent to exclude black athletes, however, would be unlawful. Several
factors would be relevant to such an allegation: the fact that the
use of standardized test scores would have a greater impact on
black athletes than on white athletes was known by the Ad Hoc
Committee; the committee refused to consider less exclusionary al-
ternatives to the rule; and representatives of blacks and predomi-
nately black institutions were excluded from the "legislative
process.""1
A second approach to the equal protection issue challenges the
rationality of the new rule. It is unlawful to draw irrational classifi-
cations between people, 2 but deference is usually given to legisla-
tive decisions. An important basis for this deference is the repre-
sentative nature of a legislative process. In the present situation,
however, the legislative process was flawed in that it did not per-
mit the participation of all groups significantly affected by the leg-
islation.' 3 In Parish," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, after
finding state action, followed the deferential approach and upheld
the 1.6 rule by applying the "minimum rationality" standard.
C. Private Association Law Issues
Common law principles exist governing private associations
which voluntarily join together.' 5 The courts have consistently
given deference to such organizations based primarily upon theo-
ries of freedom of association and freedom of contract.' A private
organization extending the scope of its activities into the public
domain, however, may receive less deference and more judicial su-
90. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976).
91. Yasser, supra note 43, at 100-01.
92. Greene, supra note 8, at 130.
93. Id. at 133.
94. 506 F.2d at 1034.
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pervision 9 7 In some instances, private organizations exert such
control over a particular activity that an individual who desires to
participate has no choice regarding joining the organization." The
district court in Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma
v. NCAA" noted that membership in the NCAA was not voluntary
in a meaningful sense. Any institution, private or public, seeking to
participate in intercollegiate athletics in any meaningful sense has
no choice but to join the NCAA. State financial pressures and con-
straints may also provide an incentive to public institutions to join
the NCAA and get a cut of the lucrative television contracts and
gate receipts.10
Existing association law principles provide for evaluation of
the action taken by an association only when it is alleged that the
action violates the association's bylaws, involves fraud, or is capri-
cious, arbitrary, or illegal. 101 It is not alleged that the promulgation
of the new eligibility rules are in violation of the association's by-
laws or involve any fraud or illegality. Consequently, the tradi-
tional deference given to governing bodies would probably protect
the rule.
10 2
It has been suggested that a more meaningful evaluation of an
association's action would involve consideration of the following el-
ements: the extent to which the interests of all individuals and
groups likely to be affected by the action were represented;
whether impermissible ends were incorporated into the action; and
whether the action is a reasonable resolution of an issue, given the
existence of competing interests. 0 3 As discussed earlier, several
groups were not included in the formulation process which resulted
in the new eligibility rule. Black athletes, predominantly black in-
stitutions and secondary schools, 04 all of which are significantly
affected by the NCAA's action, were excluded from the process.
The lack of adequate representation of affected interests weakens
97. Id. (citing Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969)).
98. Id. at 135.
99. 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 707 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
100. Martin, supra note 49, at 74-75.
101. Greene, supra note 8, at 138 (citing Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n of Col-
leges and Secondary Schools, 271 F. Supp. 65, 70 (N.D. Ill. 1967)).
102. Greene, supra note 8, at 138.
103. Id. at 138-39.
104. Secondary schools are affected by the new rule because it will be necessary for the
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the validity of the rule. In light of the Supreme Court's current
interpretation of the equal protection clause, judicial scrutiny of
possible racial motivation behind the rule would probably be lim-
ited.105 Although the reasonableness of the rule may be questiona-
ble, reasonableness analysis does not include an evaluation of rep-
resentation or disproportionate impact.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES
The Ad Hoc Committee apparently did not consider alterna-
tive schemes which could have less racial impact."' 6 The current
initial eligibility rule will do little to attain the goals of the Ad Hoc
Committee. It has been estimated that playing football at a Divi-
sion I school requires forty to sixty hours per week, the equivalent
of a full time job.10 7 Playing basketball requires at least thirty-five
hours per week.108 The minimum standards posed by the new rule
could hardly be expected to ensure success, or even a marked in-
crease in graduation rates for athletes, in light of the time con-
straints involved in participation in certain sports as well as the
incentives that lead to the ranking of athletics above education.
Perhaps the best way to ensure that freshman athletes get off to a
good start at college would be to bar freshmen from participating
in collegiate athletic events and severely limit a freshman's prac-
tice time.109 In addition to these changes, extending financial aid
scholarships to five years and allowing freshman to retain all four
years of eligibility would be tremendous steps towards returning
academic integrity to college athletics.110
Possible alternatives which would be less exclusionary than
the new rule include: (1) use of either a minimum grade point aver-
age or a minimum standardized test score, (2) complete removal of
the standardized test score from the formula (3) a return to the
NCAA's old 1.6 rule,'1 (4) freshman ineligibility, (5) five year
scholarships with four years of eligibility, 2 or (6) loss of scholar-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 107.
107. Norton, No Time for Classes: Many Athletes Go to College Hoping to Play Pro-
fessionally . .. But Now They Are Suing Because They Failed to Get an Education, 4(7)
CALIFORNIA LAW. 44 (1984).
108. Greene, supra note 8, at 145.
109. Farrell, About 400 Freshman Athletes in Big-Time Sports Are Ineligible to Com-
pete Under New Rules, Chronicle of Higher Education, Sept. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
110. Id. See also Norton, supra note 102, at 48.
111. Greene, supra note 8, at 146.
112. Farrell & Monaghan, supra note 106, at 48, col. 5.
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ships based on a failure to graduate a certain percentage of stu-
dent-athletes.11 s The first three alternatives would eliminate the
disproportionate racial impact, the point on which the current rule
has received the vast majority of its criticism; however, they would
do very little to achieve the NCAA's goal of restoring academic in-
tegrity to collegiate athletics. All three are subject to abuse and
cheating, such as altered high school records. Additionally, none of
the first three alternatives ensure that an athlete will receive an
education once he or she is admitted.
Freshman ineligibility and extension of scholarships to five
years to allow completion of a course of study are more substantial
moves towards NCAA goals. Athletic scholarships are often the
only way some people can afford a college education. Extending
scholarships to five years will bolster the NCAA's claim that stu-
dent-athletes are students first and athletes second by ensuring
that they have an opportunity to complete their educations with-
out the burden of costs which otherwise would keep the athlete out
of college. The sixth alternative, loss of scholarships, would force
schools to see that athletes devote time to study and receive proper
counseling and tutoring with an eye towards graduation as well as
maintaining eligibility. Perhaps the best alternative is a combina-
tion of these approaches. A minimum eligibility requirement or
freshman ineligibility in addition to the extension of athletic schol-
arships will guarantee both that the athlete has the capability to
attend college and that he or she has the opportunity to finish.
A final alternative is to abandon the idea of amateurism in
some areas of collegiate athletics. "' Sports such as football and
basketball have become very lucrative ventures for some colleges
due to the multi-million dollar television contracts, substantial
gate receipts and the possibility of professional contracts for the
athletes.1 5 It is very unlikely that colleges would be willing to sac-
rifice these revenues in order to return academics to the priority
113. Norton, supra note 94, at 48.
114. Greene, supra note 8, at 146. The Nebraska legislature took steps towards this
approach earlier this year. Notwithstanding the NCAA prohibition on payments to students,
a law was proposed that would pay student athletes at the University of Nebraska a stipend.
The law would go into effect only if a majority of the remaining Big Eight Conference
schools passed a similar law. The Nebraska legislature initially defeated the bill, but even-
tually passed it in order to urge the NCAA to reconsider its position. Governor Kay Orr
vetoed the bill, stating that "an expression to the NCAA through the enactment of a statute
is inappropriate." See Miami Herald, April 9, 1988, at C3, col. 1; Miami Herald, April 14,
1988, at C4, col. 6. These actions also neatly underscore the contention that the NCAA
operates with state action.
115. Id. at 147.
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position they once held. It is argued that because college teams
have essentially become the training grounds for some professional
sports, abandoning the distinction between amateur and profes-
sional athletics would certainly be a less hypocritical approach
than the current situation.1 Such a solution would remove the
need for concern regarding the academic achievements of the ath-
letes. It also may lead to compensation for the athletes and to a
system under which the professional leagues would support the
college's programs by sharing their profits as compensation for the
training of potential professional athletes.1 7 The alternative may
offend those who still hold to the traditional notion of a student-
athlete. Abandoning the idea of amateurism in favor of support
from the professional leagues, however, may actually be less offen-
sive because it lessens the monetary burden of the educational in-
stitutions which support the teams and allows for stricter stan-
dards in the pursuit of higher education. But, as stated before, the
schools are likely to be unwilling to sacrifice the revenues which
intercollegiate athletics raises and will continue to search for some
middle ground.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper examined the NCAA's initial eligibility rule as an
answer to the problems of academic integrity in the context of col-
legiate athletics. The rule, as currently in effect, has a substantially
disproportionate impact on black athletes. Judicial challenges to
the rule based on this impact, however, are not likely to succeed.
In addition to a disproportionate impact, the rule would seem to
be fairly ineffective in attaining the goal set out by the NCAA. The
NCAA sought to reestablish the idea that student-athletes are stu-
dents first and athletes second. If the NCAA is sincere in its ef-
forts, a much more drastic reform is necessary.
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